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In this paper we analyze the set of scalar algebraic Riccati equations (ARE)
that play an important role in ﬁnding feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar
N-player linear-quadratic diﬀerential game. We show that in general there
exist at most 2N − 1 solutions of the (ARE) that give rise to a Nash equi-
librium. In particular we analyze the number of equilibria as a function of
the autonomous growth parameter and present both necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of a unique solution of the ARE.
Keywords: Diﬀerential games, Linear-quadratic control, Feedback Nash
equilibrium, Algebraic Riccati equations1 Introduction
During the last decade there has been an increasing interest in studying sev-
eral problems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In
particular in the area of environmental economics and macro-economic pol-
icy coordination this is a very natural framework for modeling problems (see
e.g. Engwerda et al. [2] for references). In, e.g., policy coordination prob-
lems usually two basic questions arise: ﬁrst, are policies coordinated and,
second, which information do the participating parties have. Usually both
these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for diﬀerent possible
scenarios are calculated and compared with each other. One of these scenar-
ios is the so-called feedback Nash scenario (see Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1] for a
precise deﬁnition and survey of the relevant literature).
Since according to this scenario the participating parties can react to each
other’s policies, its relevance is in economics usually larger than that of the
open-loop Nash scenario. In particular the feedback Nash scenario is very
popular in studying problems where the underlying model can be described
by a (set of) linear diﬀerential equation(s) and the individual objectives pur-
sued by the parties can be approximated by functions which quadratically
penalize deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the assumption
that the parties have a ﬁnite planning horizon, this problem was ﬁrst ana-
lyzed by Starr and Ho in [6] (see also Lukes [4] for a result on uniqueness
within the class of aﬃne memoryless strategies).
In this paper we study the inﬁnite planning horizon case and concentrate
on solving the algebraic Riccati equations associated with this problem. In
2Weeren et al. [7] it was shown that in the two-player scalar case the num-
ber of solutions to these equations can vary between one and three (see also
Engwerda [3] for a detailed study under which conditions on the system pa-
rameters these diﬀerent situations occur). In this paper we study the general
N-player scalar case. We show that for any number N of players there exists
a positive number such that if the autonomous growth parameter is larger
than this number, there exist (in general) 2N − 1 solutions for the (ARE)
equations yielding a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we give both necessary
and suﬃcient conditions under which there is exactly one solution for the
(ARE) equations.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating
the problem analyzed in this paper. Section three analyzes the solutions of
the algebraic Riccati equations. These results are used in section four to ﬁnd
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique solution. The
paper ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Problem statement
In this paper we consider the problem in which N parties (henceforth called
players) aim at minimization of their individual quadratic performance cri-
teria. Each player controls a diﬀerent set of inputs to a single system. The
system is described by the following diﬀerential equation
˙ x = ax +
N X
i=1
biui, x(0) = x0. (1)
Here x is the state of the system, ui is a (control) variable player i can
manipulate, x0 is the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, a (the
3”autonomous growth” parameter) and bi, i ∈ N := {1,..,N}, are constant
system parameters, and ˙ x denotes the time derivative of x.










We assume that both qi and ri are positive and bi diﬀers from zero.
We consider the existence of limiting stationary feedback Nash equilibria of
this diﬀerential game.





kjsj)ki + qi + sik
2
i = 0, i ∈ N (2)




Since both qi and ri are positive it is obvious that Ji > 0, whenever x0 6= 0.
Therefore, we immediately deduce from Ba¸ sar and Olsder [1, proposition 6.8]
that:
Theorem 1: Let ¯ ki > 0 solve the set of Riccati equations (2).
Then the stationary feedback policies
ui = −r
−1
i bi ¯ kix, i ∈ N, (3)
provide a Nash equilibrium, yielding the cost Ji(u1,···,uN) := ¯ kix2
0, for
player i. Moreover, the resulting system dynamics described by ˙ x = aclx,
with acl := a −
PN
i=1 si¯ ki, is asymptotically stable. ￿
In fact we conclude from Weeren et al. [7, corollary 3.1] that, when the
4players are restricted at the outset to memoryless strategies (cf. Lukes [4]),
existence of a positive solution to the above scalar Riccati equations is both
a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for existence of a feedback Nash equi-
librium.
A natural question which arises is: how many solutions does the above set
of algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) have. To analyze this question we in-
troduce (for notational convenience) the following variables:
σi := siqi;κi := siki, i ∈ N; and κN+1 := −acl.
Using this notation, (2) can be rewritten as
κ
2
i − 2κN+1κi + σi = 0, i ∈ N, (4)
where




So our problem can be reformulated as follows.
Problem statement 2: Assume σi > 0. Find conditions under which the
N quadratic equations (4) under the equality constraint (5) have a positive
solution κi, i ∈ N + 1. ￿
In the next section we will study this problem in detail.
3 The solution set
From B´ ezout’s theorem (see e.g. Shafarevich [5]) we know that the number
of intersection points of a set of N quadratic polynomial equations will not
5exceed the product of the degrees of the equations (if things are appropriately
deﬁned). Consequently, our equations will have at most 2N real solutions.
We will show in theorems 6 and 9 that the number of positive solutions may
range from 1 up to 2N − 1. We will see that this implies that there also
exists always at least one negative solution to (ARE). If N = 2, a = −1
2, and
σ1 = σ2 = 1
2, easy calculations show that (ARE) has two real solutions. This
shows that in general the number of real solutions of (ARE) can be strictly
smaller than 2N − 1.
To simplify the analysis below we will assume, without loss of generality,
that the σi’s satisfy σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ σ3 ≥ ··· ≥ σN. Lemma 3 reformulates our
problem statement 2 in terms of just one unknown scalar variable κN+1.
Lemma 3: Problem 2 has a solution if and only if there exist ti ∈ {−1,1},
i ∈ N, such that the equation
(N − 1)κN+1 + t1
q
κ2
N+1 − σ1 + ··· + tN
q
κ2
N+1 − σN = a. (6)
has a solution κN+1 ≥
√
σ1.
Proof: ” ⇒ ” Consider (4). Obviously,
√
σ1 ≤ κN+1 must hold. Fur-
thermore, we conclude that (4) has two positive solutions: κi = κN+1 +
q
κ2
N+1 − σi and κi = κN+1 −
q
κ2
N+1 − σi, i ∈ N. Substitution into (5)
proves the claim.
” ⇐ ” Let κN+1 ≥
√
σ1 solve (6). Deﬁne κi by κN+1 + ti
q
κ2
N+1 − σi, where
ti is as in (6). Then it is straightforward to verify that κ1 > 0,···,κN > 0
satisfy (4,5). ￿.
6To study the number of solutions κN+1 >
√
σ1 of (6), we deﬁne recursively
the following functions for n ∈ N − 1:
f
n+1
i (x) := f
n
i (x) + x −
p






i (x) + x +
p











x2 − σ1. (9)
As a result of this construction, the functions fN










σ1), i ∈ 2
N − 1. (10)








x2 − σi (11)
f
N
2 (x) = (N − 1)x +
p








3 (x) = (N − 1)x −
p
x2 − σ1 +
p




x2 − σi. (13)
Now, each function fN
i , i ∈ 2N − 1, corresponds to a function obtained
from the left hand side of (6) by making a speciﬁc choice of tj,j ∈ N, and
substituting x for κN+1.
From lemma 3 it is obvious then that problem 2 has a solution if and only if
fN
i = a has a solution x ≥
√
σ1 for some i ∈ 2N. Consequently, the number of








i − a) = 0. (14)
We will denote the function on the left hand side of this equation, Π2N
i=1(fN
i −
a), by f(x) and show below that it is a polynomial of degree 2N. To that end,
we concentrate for the moment on the 2-player case. Introducing a0 := x−a
and ai :=
√
x2 − σi,i = 1,2, it is easily veriﬁed that f(x) has the following
algebraic structure
f(a0,a1,a2) := (a0 −a1 −a2)(a0 +a1 −a2)(a0 −a1 +a2)(a0 +a1 +a2). (15)
The structure of f for the general N-player case is similar and is omitted in
order to avoid unnecessary cumbersome notation. Using this structure we
show next that all entries ai in f appear quadratically.




i for some nonnegative integers ki satisfying
PN
i=0 2ki = 2N.
Proof: It is easily veriﬁed that f(−a0,a1,···,aN) = (−1)2N
f(a0,···,aN) =
f(a0,···,aN) and, also, f(a0,···,−ai,···,aN) = f(a0,···,ai,···,aN), for
any i ∈ N.
Now, assume that f has a term in which, e.g., a0 has an odd exponent. Then
collect all terms of f containing odd exponents in a0. As a consequence
f = a0g(a0,···,aN)+h(a0,···,aN), where a0 appears with an even exponent
in all terms of both g and h. Since f(−a0,a1,···,aN) = f(a0,a1,···,aN) we
conclude immediately from this that g must be zero. The rest of the proof
8follows in a straightforward manner. ￿
Corollary 5: f(x) is a polynomial of degree 2N.
Proof: Let a0 := (N − 1)x − a and ai :=
√
x2 − σi. With this notation,
f(x) coincides with (15). The result follows directly from lemma 4. ￿
Using this corollary we can easily derive the following result on the num-
ber of solutions to the (ARE) equations
Theorem 6: (ARE) has at least one and at most 2N −1 positive solutions.
Proof: Using the notation of corollary 5, we show that the polynomial
f(x) has at most 2N − 1 roots larger than
√
σ1. To this end we rewrite f as
f = Π
2N−2
i=1 (a0 −(a1+gi))(a0+(a1 +gi))(a0 −(a1−gi))(a0+(a1−gi)), (16)
where gi is a linear combination (with coeﬃcients +1 or −1) of a2,···,aN.




Now at x =
√





0 − (gi)2)2 > 0. Furthermore, it is easily veriﬁed that except
for the term a0−
PN
i=1 ai, all terms a0±a1±gi in (16) are positive if x → ∞.
Therefore, the leading term x2N of the polynomial has a negative sign. So, we
conclude that the polynomial always has a root located at the left hand side
of
√
σ1; or, stated diﬀerently, (ARE) has at most 2N − 1 positive solutions.
To see that (ARE) always has at least one positive solution, we study the
9equations fN
1 (x) = a and fN







σ1). Since both functions are continuous with limx→∞ fN
1 (x) = −∞
and limx→∞ fN
2 (x) = ∞, it is clear that either the equation fN
1 (x) = a or
fN
2 (x) = a has a solution x ≥
√
σ1, which completes the proof. ￿
Remark 7: By substituting κi = −τi into (4,5) it is readily veriﬁed that
(ARE) has a negative solution if and only if the set of equations
τ
2




has a positive solution. So, from the previous theorem we immediately con-
clude that (ARE) will always have at least one negative solution. ￿
Next, we analyze how the number of solutions of (ARE) varies with the
autonomous growth parameter a. To get an impression of this relationship,
we show for the three player case the curves f3
i for two diﬀerent parameter
choices in ﬁgure 1.
From the ﬁrst plot we see, by counting the number of points of the diﬀerent
curves f3
i which have level a, that the number of solutions of (ARE) increases
monotonically from 1 to 7 as a function of a. That this monotonicity does
not always hold is illustrated by the second plot, where we illustrated for
diﬀerent parameter values f3
2 and f3
3. Since f3
1 is a monotonically decreasing
function and f3
i (x) ≥ f3
3(x) for i > 3 (as we will show later on (see lemma
11)), we see from this second plot that the number of solutions ﬁrst increases
from 1 to 3 and then drops back to 1 before it increases again. In particular

































Figure 1: The curves f3
i , i = 1,···,8 for σ1 = 9; σ2 = 8; σ3 = 5, with
f3
i (3.01) < f3
i+1(3.01) i = 1,···,7 and f3
2 (lower graph), f3
3 (upper graph) for
σ1 = 9; σ2 = 8.7; σ3 = 8.65.
note from these examples that an even number of solutions occurs only for
isolated values of a, whereas an odd number of solutions occurs for values of
a in certain ranges. We will not elaborate this subject further here, but it
seems that this property holds in general.
Next, we show that the graphs of the functions fN
i (x) do not intersect if x
becomes large. To prove this property we ﬁrst concentrate on the case that
all σi diﬀer. So, we assume from now on that σ1 > σ2 > ··· > σN.
The next lemma is a preliminary result and will be used in the proof of the-
orem 9.
Lemma 8: Assume that all σi diﬀer. Then, there exists a constant x1
such that the functions fN
i (x), i = 2,···,2N do not intersect on the interval
(x1,∞).
Proof: We show that any two functions fN
i and fN
j only have a ﬁnite
11number of intersection points, from which the conclusion is obvious.
So, assume fN
i (x) = fN
j (x). Since all σi’s diﬀer, the equation fN
i − fN
j = 0
can be rewritten as
2 ∗ (t1
p
x2 − σ1 + ··· + tN
p
x2 − σN) = 0, (17)
where ti ∈ {−1,0,1} and not all ti are simultaneously zero. Now, denote
ti
√
x2 − σi by ai(x). Then the question whether (17) has a ﬁnite number
of zeros can be rephrased as whether
PN
i=1 ai(x) = 0 has a ﬁnite number of
zeros. We will prove this property for N = 3. The general case can be proved
similarly.
So, we have to prove that a1 +a2 +a3 = 0 has only a ﬁnite number of zeros.
As in (15) we consider the following function
f(a1,a2,a3) := (a1 − a2 − a3)(a1 + a2 − a3)(a1 − a2 + a3)(a1 + a2 + a3).
Obviously, a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 has a ﬁnite number of zeros, if f has a ﬁnite
number of zeros. However, using lemma 4, it is easily seen that f is a poly-
nomial whose degree is at most 8. So, f has at most 8 zeros, which proves
the claim. ￿
The next theorem states, roughly speaking, that if the uncontrolled sys-
tem is very unstable then there will be 2N − 1 equilibria.
Theorem 9: Assume that the σi diﬀer. Then, there exists a positive num-
ber ˆ a such that for every autonomous growth parameter a ≥ ˆ a the set of
algebraic Riccati equations (2) has 2N − 1 positive solutions.
12Proof: By diﬀerentiating fN
2 (x) it is easily veriﬁed that fN
2 (x) is mono-
tonically increasing for all x ≥ x∗





2 (x) = ∞ and fN




1), it follows that there exists a positive number a∗∗
1 such that for all
a ≥ a∗∗
1 the equation fN
2 (x) = a has exactly one solution. A similar reason-
ing holds for all other fN
i (x), i ∈ 2N (see also ﬁgure 1 for a rendering in
case N = 3). Next, take the maximum over all a∗∗
i . According to lemma 8,
for a ﬁxed a the solutions for fN
i (x) = a diﬀer for all i if a is chosen suﬃ-
ciently large. Therefore it is easily veriﬁed that the corresponding solutions
(κ1,···.,κN) to (4,5) will also diﬀer. ￿
Remark 10:
In case the σi do not diﬀer, it is easily veriﬁed from the above analysis that
a similar conclusion holds. That is, there exists a number ˆ a such that for all
a > ˆ a the number of solutions to (ARE) remains constant. This constant
equals the number of distinct (ultimately) monotonically increasing functions
fN
i . Without providing a formal proof we note that, if one denotes by s the











+ (s − 1)2
N−s − 1,






counts the number of
solutions that do not coincide with any other solution; (s − 1)2N−s counts
the number of solutions that occur with multiplicity > 1 and −1 comes from
the number of monotonically decreasing functions. Furthermore, it is easily
13veriﬁed that, if N = s, the number of solutions equals bN
2 c + 1. Here bN
2 c




2c = 1). So, e.g. if N = 5
and σ1 = σ2 = σ3 > σ4 > σ5, s = 3 and the maximum number of solutions
will be 15. ￿
4 Uniqueness conditions
In this section we will give in theorem 13 both necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions under which (ARE) has a unique positive solution. To solve this
problem, we study the functions fN
i as deﬁned in (7,8) in some more detail.
First we note that the functions fN
1 ,fN
2 and fN
3 satisfy a monotonicity prop-
erty.





i for any i ≥ 4.
Proof: The proof is by induction.
For N = 2, f2
1(x) = x −
√
x2 − σ1 −
√
x2 − σ2, f2
2(x) = x +
√
x2 − σ1 −
√
x2 − σ2, f2
3(x) = x −
√
x2 − σ1 +
√
x2 − σ2 and f2
4(x) = x +
√
x2 − σ1 +
√
x2 − σ2. Since by assumption σ1 ≥ σ2, the correctness of all inequalities
follows by straightforward veriﬁcation.
Now, assume the inequalities hold for N = k. Then, by deﬁnition, for
i = 1,2,3 we have f
k+1
i (x) = fk
i (x) + x −
p
x2 − σk+1 ≤ fk
i+1(x) + x −
p
x2 − σk+1 = f
k+1
i+1 (x). In a similar way we have for i = 5,···,2k that
f
k+1
i (x) = fk
i (x) + x −
p
x2 − σk+1 ≥ fk
4(x) + x −
p
x2 − σk+1 = f
k+1
4 (x),
14and for i = 2k + 1,···,2k+1 f
k+1
i+2k(x) = fk
i (x) + x +
p




x2 − σk+1 = f
k+1
4 (x). ￿
Next, we introduce a convention w.r.t. local versus global extrema. By a
local extremum we mean an extremum which occurs somewhere on the open
interval (
√
σ1,∞); whereas for the deﬁnition of a global extremum we take
the whole domain of deﬁnition [
√
σ1,∞).
The following technical results will be used in the proof of theorem 13.
Lemma 12:
i) For all i = 2,···,2N, there exists an xi such that fN
i (x) is strictly
monotonically increasing for all x ≥ xi. fN
1 (x) is strictly monotonically
decreasing.
ii) If σ1 > σ2, fN
3 (x) has exactly one local minimum.
iii) fN
2 (x) has at most two local extrema.
iv) If fN
2 (x) assumes a local minimum at x0, then x0 ≤ arg minfN
3 (x).
Proof: i) This is veriﬁed by straightforward diﬀerentiation of fN
i (x).
ii) The ﬁrst derivative of fN








So, if σ1 > σ2, limx↓
√
σ1 fN0
3 (x) = −∞ and limx→∞ fN0
3 (x) = 1. Furthermore,







(x2−σ2)3/2. Since σ1 ≥ σ2 it
is clear that fN”
3 (x) > 0. So, fN0
3 (x) has exactly one zero, from which the
15conclusion is obvious.
iii) Diﬀerentiation of fN
2 (x) (see (12)) yields fN0















(x2−σ1)3/2. Now, assume fN”
2 (x) has
a zero at p. Some rewriting of fN”

































(x2 − σ1)3/2(p2 − σi)3/2 − (x2 − σi)3/2(p2 − σ1)3/2
(x2 − σ1)3/2(p2 − σi)3/2(x2 − σi)3/2 ).
Now,
p
(x2 − σ1)(p2 − σi)−
p








(x2−σi)(p2−σ1) > 0, if and only if x > p. From this it follows
easily that fN”
2 (x) has only one root and that fN0
2 (x) has a local minimum
at p. The stated result follows directly.
iv) Assume fN
3 (x) has a local minimum at p, so fN0
3 (p) = 0. From this we








. Substitution of this expression
into fN0
2 (p + δ) yields for positive δ
f
N0
























































(p + δ)2 − σi
)
> 0,
16where the last inequality follows from the facts that σ1 ≥ σ2 and, accord-









p < ξ < p + δ.
So, the derivative of fN0
2 (x) is always positive at the right hand side of the
local minimum of fN0
2 (x), which proves the claim. ￿
Theorem 13: Assume that σ1 > σ2. Then, (ARE) has exactly one positive
solution if and only if either one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
i) fN
2 is monotonically increasing and a < minfN
3 ;
ii) fN
2 is not monotonically increasing and a satisﬁes either I. a < local min-
imum fN
2 (x) or II. local maximum fN
2 (x) < a < minfN
3 (x).
Proof:
First consider the case that fN
2 (x) is monotonically increasing. From the facts
that fN








i (x) ≥ fN
3 (x),i = 4,···,2N (lemma 11) it is obvious that for
a ﬁxed a there will be only one intersection point with the functions fN
i (x)
if and only if a is smaller than the global minimum of fN
3 (x) (see also ﬁgure
1).
Next, consider the case that fN
2 (x) is not monotonically increasing. Accord-
ing to lemma 12.iii, fN
2 (x) has then a local maximum and a local minimum.
Furthermore (lemma 12.ii and iv), this local minimum is located at the left
hand side of the local minimum of fN
3 (x) (see the second plot of ﬁgure 1 for
an illustration of this situation). Since fN
3 (x) ≥ fN
2 (x) it is clear that for
17all a smaller than the local minimum of fN
2 (x), there is only one intersec-
tion point with the diﬀerent fN
i . Obviously, when a is located between the
local minimum and the local maximum of fN
2 (x) there are three solutions.
In case the local minimum of fN
3 (x) is larger than the local maximum value
of fN
2 (x), the number of solutions drops, again, to 1. If a is larger than this
local minimum of fN
3 (x), there will always be at least one intersection point
with fN
2 (x) and one with fN
3 (x), which concludes the proof. ￿
Remark 14: In case σ1 = σ2, fN
2 (x) and fN
3 (x) coincide. Moreover, at
√
σ1, fN
i (x),i = 1,···,4 coincide. From this it is easily seen that there will
be exactly one intersection point of a with all these functions if and only if
a is smaller than the global minimum of fN
2 (x). In fact this inequality has
to be strict in case fN
2 (x) has a local minimum, which is then also the global
one. ￿
In ﬁgure 2 below we illustrate, for ﬁxed σi, the two possibilities that can
occur for the set of parameters a for which there is a unique equilibrium.
0 a1 a2 a
1 1 3 → m m # eq.
0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a
1 1 3 1 3 → m m # eq.
Figure 2: Structure of sets where (ARE) has a unique positive solution.
Here m ≤ 2N − 1 denotes the maximum number of solutions.
18We conclude this section with three related issues.
First we mention that under the condition that σ1 ≥ σ2 + ··· + σN the set
of a-parameters for which (ARE) has a unique positive solution is given by
a halﬂine.
This result follows directly from the following lemma which is proved in the
appendix
Lemma 15: If σ1 ≥ σ2+···+σN then fN
2 (x) is monotonically increasing.
￿




σ1 − σ2 there will always
be a unique positive solution too. To show this, ﬁrst note from theorem 13
that, whenever a < minimum fN
2 , (ARE) has a unique positive solution. It is
easily veriﬁed that f2
2 is monotonically increasing and therefore its minimum







σ1 − σ2. Since fN
2 (x) ≤ f
N+1
2 (x), the rest of
the argument follows by induction.
Finally, the third issue we like to address is the following. In Engwerda [2000]
it was shown, for the two-player case, that the additional requirement that
amongst all (ARE) solutions we look for a solution that minimizes aggregate
performance always gives rise to a unique solution. This property does not
hold for the general case, as we can see from the ﬁrst plot of ﬁgure 1. In
this ﬁgure we see that the curves f3
4 and f3
5 intersect at some point (κ∗
4,a∗)
(approximately (3.2,6.5)). From (5) we therefore conclude that at this point
19for both solutions we have κ1+κ2+κ3 = κ∗
4+a∗. Now, choose the parameters
bi and ri such that s1 = s2 = s3 = 1 (and consequently, q1 = 9;q2 = 8
and q3 = 5). Then ki = κi and consequently the cost player i has at this
equilibrium is x2
0κi. So, the aggregate cost is x2
0(κ1+κ2+κ3). Consequently,
at a = a∗ two diﬀerent solutions yield the same aggregate cost, which is
obviously (see ﬁgure 1 again) also the minimum attainable aggregate cost in
this case.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the positive solutions of the algebraic Riccati
equations that play an important role in the study of limiting stationary
feedback Nash equilibria in the N-player linear quadratic scalar diﬀerential
game. We showed that this set of equations always has a ﬁnite number of
diﬀerent positive solutions and that this number is bounded by 2N − 1. In
particular we analyzed the set of autonomous growth parameters for which
(ARE) has a unique positive solution. Fixing all other system parameters,
we saw that this set is either a halﬂine or the union of a halﬂine and an
open (bounded) interval. We showed how this set can be determined from
the analysis of two scalar functions. It has turned out that for all stable
systems there is a unique solution to the (ARE) equations. In this respect it
is interesting to recall from the two-player case (see Engwerda [2000]) that
whenever the system is not stable, there always exist combinations of the
remaining system parameters such that (ARE) has more than one positive
solution.
20On the other hand we have shown that there is a threshold such that if the
autonomous growth parameter exceeds this threshold (assuming all other
system parameters are ﬁxed), the number of positive solutions does not in-
crease. In general this number of positive solutions is 2N − 1.
In between these two limiting cases, the number of solutions gradually builds
up from 1 to the maximum number if the autonomous growth parameter
increases. However, this growth is (in general) not monotonic. So, roughly
speaking, the conclusion is that the larger the instability of the system is,
the more positive solutions the (ARE) equations will have.
The above outcomes raise a couple of new questions. One of them is whether
aggregate eﬃciency can be used as an additional constraint to determine a
unique equilibrium amongst all solutions of the (ARE). We showed in an
example that this is not the case. The main remaining topic is of course how
things generalize for the multivariable case. In view of the above analysis
presented for the scalar case it seems a good idea to treat ﬁrst the case of
a system with a multivariable state and scalar controls. We hope that the
obtained above results may be helpful in analyzing this problem.
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